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Introduction
E=mc2 in the hands of Adolph Hitler. In the summer of 1939, that 
nightmare was on the minds of two Martians as they drove through 
the North Fork of Long Island hoping to get the signature of the one 
man who might forestall catastrophe.
Leo Szilard and Edward Teller were fellow Hungarians, fellow 
physicists, and fellow Jews who fled Germany after they received 
PhDs and before the Nazi vise tightened. Both delighted in the tale 
that so many geniuses hailed from their native Budapest because 
they were descendants of visitors from the neighboring Red Planet 
passing among us as Magyars.1
As they raced along Route 25, Szilard and Teller knew that Ger-
man scientists were among the pioneers of quantum physics, that 
ample quantities of fissile uranium had come under the control of 
the Reich, and that the combination of knowledge and material could 
produce a bomb that would lead to swastikas flying over the capi-
tals of Europe.
Making a right turn onto Skunk Lane in Cutchogue, Szilard and 
Teller were a couple of miles from the summer residence of Albert 
Einstein. The drive was a return trip for Szilard, who had visited 
Einstein a few weeks before with Eugene Wigner, another Hungar-
ian physicist. Szilard’s familiarity with the area meant that he and 
Teller would find the house on Old Grove Road without getting lost 
on Nassau Point, the custom for first- time visitors looking for the 
great man.
The purpose of the trip was to try to wrap up a letter that Szilard 
needed to send to somebody in authority to sound the alarm about a 
Nazi bomb. He realized that, if he contacted a public official directly, 
the reaction he could expect would be, “Who the hell is Leo Szilard?” 
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Not only was Einstein the most famous scientist in the world, but he 
also knew everybody. And somewhere in his collection of admirers 
was the person to whom the letter should be sent.
The queen of Belgium was a possibility. Her country had colonized 
the Congo, where vast supplies of the crucial element uranium- 235 
were held, a relatively easy target for Nazi extraction. Einstein had 
met her, but he thought a minister in the Belgian government was a 
more sensible choice. Learning of that idea, Wigner countered that, 
with Europe on the brink of war, immigrants contacting a foreign 
official without going through the State Department could be hard 
to explain to a congressional committee.
Showing that genius has its limits, Einstein and company pre-
pared to ask Charles Lindbergh to carry the message to Franklin 
Roosevelt. They soon realized that the Lone Eagle was busy craft-
ing a national address that trumpeted the wisdom of isolationism 
and, unable to repress his antisemitism, hinted at the patriotic duty 
of the barons who controlled American media to refrain from lur-
ing the nation into war.
Alexander Sachs turned out to be their man. He knew FDR per-
sonally, having written speeches on economics for him in the 1932 
campaign. Sachs determined that the letter was too important for 
him to limit himself to being its postman. He told Einstein and 
Szilard that he not only would deliver the letter himself but would 
explain its contents to the president, lest its message die a common 
bureaucratic death.
Weeks passed with no word from Sachs. What could possibly 
be holding up a matter of such urgency? Sachs was looking for the 
right moment when the president would have the time and focus to 
absorb the ominous news. The opportunity came finally in the mid-
dle of October. After hearing Sachs, FDR commanded, “This requires 
action,” setting in motion what would become the Manhattan Project.
None too soon. Six weeks before, the German army had rolled 
into Poland, turning a question of theoretical physics into a race for 
the decisive weapon of the war.
The Prometheus Bomb reveals a vacuum of leadership in the research 
and development of nuclear weapons during World War II. Who 
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assessed the costs and risks of building the atomic bomb? Who chose 
the most effective strategy for building the weapon? Who decided 
how to pay for it? Personnel issues? Location? Security? Who bal-
anced all those considerations against competing claims elsewhere 
in the war effort? The answer is many people, thus no individual. 
Franklin Roosevelt made the ultimate decisions in the Manhattan 
Project, but his inability to comprehend the science at the heart of 
the effort meant that his determinations consisted of best guesses 
and trust in subordinates rather than informed judgment.
The Manhattan Project was the first case of a new type of chal-
lenge for the American republic. Our government must now fash-
ion public policy for issues where a small group of brilliant scientists 
affect the entire population with discoveries and inventions that could 
secure or threaten our existence and our future. Bioengineering can 
target the human brain, alter livestock beyond nature’s constraints, 
and create artificial life. Economic development and convenience in 
one part of the planet may trigger environmental disasters elsewhere. 
Combinations of robotics and artificial intelligence (ai) may force 
us to consider the meaning of human. In these and related ques-
tions, who should make the critical decisions, and by what process? 
The question is especially urgent with the nation’s survival at stake.
In the American community, public policy had been the realm of 
politicians and bureaucrats. Those officials supervised even great engi-
neering projects. Without grasping all the details, they understood rail 
transportation within cities and across the nation. A ditch through 
Central America? Sure. Flying machines? You bet. The Manhattan 
Project introduced new actors in policy making because Franklin 
Roosevelt had no capacity to supervise Nobel Prize winners while 
they penetrated the essence of matter and energy. The president did 
have capable subordinates like Vannevar Bush, Leslie Groves, and 
Henry Stimson. Their backgrounds in engineering, warfare, and 
diplomacy prepared them to manage the alpha males in science, 
industry, academics, and the military who tackled perhaps the great-
est engineering challenge in history. But not one of those aides alone 
had sufficient knowledge or authority to oversee every aspect of the 
Manhattan Project.
The collaboration of experts from different fields repeatedly faced 
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complications from contending personalities and professional cul-
tures. It fell to American government to control the turmoil of those 
rivalries, to keep the talent and resources focused on a weapon that 
might be necessary to America’s survival, and to do so without aban-
doning the values for which the nation fought.
In this case, “American government” means Franklin Roosevelt. 
We will see him set a tone for the people in his administration that 
facilitated a bristling exchange of ideas followed by confidence, win 
or lose, in the decision reached. Army brats worked with scions of 
the Eastern Establishment. Some Nobel physicists worked relent-
lessly on an atomic bomb that they later argued should not be used. 
Some military officers counseled against dropping the bomb on 
Japan and were countered by career politicians using a different cal-
culus. Nobody won every bureaucratic battle, but strong egos had 
the humility to accept the decisions that they had opposed. Politics, 
even in the most urgent circumstances, was an art practiced ener-
getically and gracefully, a reflection of FDR.
The story of the Manhattan Project is a story of war, so it is a trag-
edy. Heroes abound, and they can be celebrated without becoming 
depressed about our own times. The 1940s also included nature’s 
usual share of deplorables and knuckleheads, so we can look back 
for inspiration and encouragement rather than despair that we fall 
short of our own heritage.
We find much to consider in that retrospective: Leslie Groves, the 
army engineer, returning from his initial meeting with Vannevar 
Bush, the mit engineer, bewildered by Bush’s own befuddlement. 
For his part, Bush was on the phone stopping just short of trying 
to get Groves fired. We find Henry Stimson, the patrician secre-
tary of war, bristling when Dwight Eisenhower explained why we 
shouldn’t drop atomic bombs on Japan, a position with which Stim-
son agreed. We read that Stimson and Groves contended for weeks 
over targets in Japan and then that Groves expressed gratitude to 
the secretary for arguments that reduced casualties. We puzzle that 
all but a handful of members of Congress were kept in ignorance 
about the Manhattan Project while Soviet spies strolled about Los 
Alamos. Not puzzling at all, we see Congress furiously reengage at 
the end of the war to battle the executive for control of policy and 
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programs. We discover the public implications of the great friend-
ship between Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, especially 
poignant for being forged in war. We read as the story shifts from 
FDR pressing through rapidly declining health to secure the postwar 
world to Harry Truman picking up the mantle, carrying through 
to the war’s conclusion, fighting a revived Congress, and laying the 
foundations for the Cold War.
If we struggle to assume honor, wisdom, and courage in America’s 
public officials, we might at least assume sincerity. The questions 
remain: How did a president and a few members of Congress man-
age scientists whose work was incomprehensible? Could a public, 
whose taxes sustained that scientific work and whose lives were jeop-
ardized in some of the experiments, know about the endeavor when 
secrecy was paramount? If they did know, how could they under-
stand the issues before them? In short, how can we trust or control 
experts when we have no idea what they’re talking about?
We live with the legacy of the Manhattan Project beyond even the 
thousands of nuclear warheads that are stockpiled about the planet or 
the efforts of turbulent regimes and terrorist groups to obtain those 
weapons. Building the bomb also established patterns of authority, 
models of organization, and a culture of secrecy that were harbin-
gers for a type of public choice that has been with us since a shat-
tered Japan surrendered on the deck of the uss Missouri.
Until the Manhattan Project, public works in America confined 
their potential catastrophes to folks in the neighborhood. If the dam 
burst, the train derailed, the schoolhouse caught fire, or the bridge 
collapsed, the immediate pain was local. If you didn’t live below the 
lake or next to the tracks, if your kids weren’t in that school, or your 
car on that bridge, your reaction would be relief and compassion: 
“Glad it wasn’t us” and “Oh, those poor people.” The Manhattan 
Project changed that calculus by introducing a new kind of disas-
ter, one that removed the physical limits of tragedy.
Releasing the energy within the nuclei of atoms meant that the 
initial explosions and the subsequent radiation could conceivably 
reach every corner of the globe. Natural barriers such as oceans, 
mountains, and deserts once protected some people from the con-
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flicts of others. Neutrality or a treaty with a powerful noncomba-
tant state might keep a nation safe. But given enough countries at 
war and enough nuclear weapons at their disposal, nature would 
provide very few places to hide, and a treaty would likely be incin-
erated in the first exchange.
In the nuclear age, billions of people have been affected by the 
decisions of a very small band of officials. Just as significant, if the 
public did have access to the key issues, the opportunity would have 
been pointless. In a nuclear war, retail clerks, ballerinas, and Wall 
Street traders would not understand the weapon that killed them, 
but they would be every bit as dead as the geniuses who conceived 
the bomb. So, are we condemned to government in the dark where 
the most ominous decisions in science, ones of life and death signif-
icance for all of us, remain in the hands of a gifted few?
Two thousand years ago, Juvenal asked a question that James Mad-
ison would have appreciated: Quis custodiat ipsos custodes? Who 
guards the guardians? In our system of government, the answer is, 
“We do.” But how do we do so when the guardians’ work involves 
concepts and vocabulary that the rest of us are unable to understand?
Ask a financial adviser where to put your money. Talk to a guidance 
counselor about the middle school years. Call the Building Depart-
ment about adding a deck to your house. Listen to a mechanic tell 
you whether your car is worth that repair. Entirely common expe-
riences, but never mundane. Routine though these interactions are, 
we generally need experts to help us navigate them.
If we’re baffled by municipal bonds, the adolescent brain, rear 
yard setbacks, or power trains, more complexity is coming in the 
years ahead. Who will decide if we should be the objects of surveil-
lance by satellites of the National Security Agency or by drones of 
the local police? Craig Venter’s labs have fashioned synthetic bac-
teria. How far into the animal kingdom can that technology pene-
trate? Robotics, artificial intelligence, and genetic engineering will 
force us to wonder about the meaning of human with more urgency 
than we do when considering hominid fossils from the Rift Valley.
As C. P. Snow famously put the matter, “It is dangerous to have 
two cultures which can’t or don’t communicate. In a time when sci-
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ence is determining much of our destiny, that is, whether we live 
or die, it is dangerous in the most practical terms. Scientists can 
give bad advice and decision- makers can’t know whether it is good 
or bad.”2 He concluded that we were following the news from sci-
ence, “as though listening to a foreign language in which one only 
knows a few words.”3 The danger to which Snow referred began with 
atomic fission.
The Manhattan Project was the first of a new type of public choice: 
life and death on a national scale. The effort began out of a fear that 
Germany would be the first combatant to develop an atomic bomb. 
Even after we saw that we would not be the target of an atomic 
attack, we pressed ahead as the bomb consumed resources, pushed 
aside other priorities, engendered secrecy, and likely ensured that 
we would never again disband our military after hostilities ceased.
Building the new type of bomb was an intriguing story with great 
significance for the outcome of World War II and for the future of 
life- altering science in our nation. The history of the Manhattan Proj-
ect can be especially instructive as we again strike a balance in our 
government between authority and restraint in the face of scientific 
challenges the framers of the Constitution could not have imagined.
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